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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JOANN E. BOOTH, aka JOANN
E. CR011PTON,
Plaintiff & Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 15,276

ROBERT CROMPTON,
Defendant & Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action on a foreign divorce decree to enforce payment of arrearages in support obligations.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court found the plaintiff-respondent entitled
to judgment against the defendant-appellant in the amount of
$11,220.65.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-appellant claims that the decision of the
trial court was erroneous in that the plaintiff-respondent
had assigned her rights to the cause of action, and was not
entitled to bring it or to have judgment thereon.
FACTS OF THE CASE
Plaintiff-respondent Mrs. Crompton 1 and defendantappell~nt

Robert Crompton were divorced by a decree of the

~:,~cror~;,~~a,:;
r~c:,:larried
and is
known
as nrs.
but
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library.
Funding for digitization
provided
by the Institute
of MuseumBooth,
and Library Services
fur~ cLlrity will
be and
refer-reel
as 11rs.
Crompton.
Library Services
Technology Act,to
administered
by the Utah
State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Clackamas County, Oregon, Court, filed July 9, 1969.
46).

(R.

The decree provided for payment by Robert Crompton of

$150.00 per month child support.

( R.

4 7).

This amount was reduced to $100.00 per month on Feb-

ruary 1, 1974.

(Exhibit 1).

Though Mr. Crompton was

irregular in making payments, he paid a substantial amount,
exhibited by his receipts and by a copy of a payment record
kept by the Oregon Court.

(Exhibits 4 and 1).

Nrs. Cromptor.

sought judicial enforcement of present support payments
several times, but never sought payment of delinquencies.
(T. 5:30-6:7).
During this period of time, Mrs. Crompton received
welfare payments for support from the State of Oregon.
7:22-26).

(R.

This was apparently done under the Oregon URESA

program (Uniform Reciprocal Support Act, O.R.S. Chapter 110)
since Mr. Crompton was then required to make his support
payments to the clerk of the county court.

(See Exhibit 1).

Hrs. Crompton testified that she assigned all her rights to
support payments to the state of Oregon.
is consistent with URESA practice.
Utah Code Ann.

(R.

8:8-18).

This

See O.R.S. §110.081 and

77-6la-8.

The defendant-appellant Robert Crompton has continuously maintained that Mrs. Crompton cannot sue tore-

cover the obligation assigned to the State of Oregon.
his Answer, he stated:
Defendant affirm~tively alleges that if,
in fact, there is <Jn'J sur.1 of J.June>v unp:J irl
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In

by the defendant to the plaintiff, that
the plaintiff has duly and regularly assigned
all of her right, title, and interest in
and to that payment to the State of Oregon
and that the plaintiff has no further right,
title, or interest in and to her alleged
claim.
( R. 31).
In examination of Mrs. Crompton at trial, defendant
pursued this theory, and elicited an admission of the
assignment.
[tlr. Lewis] And 1~hen did you go off
receiving assistance?

Q.

A.
[l1rs. Crompton] 1 think in JanuaryFebruary, because I started a work program
in which I was going to college, which now
I am still working under a program.

Q.

January or Febru0ry of this

y~ar?

A.
Yes, because I have been in this
school for nine months, almost.

Q.
Is it safe to say then that up till
that time all the rights you had have been
assigned to the State of Oregon while you
are receiving assistance?
A.

That the support payments were, yes.

(R.

8:8-18)

Though the court found against the defendant-appellant on
the effect of the assignments, defendant again raised the
issue in objecting to the proposed findings of fact:
Defendant objects to the Court's Finding
No. 5 upon the grounds and for the reasons
that the uncontradicted testimony of the
plaintiff was that she had assigned all
of her interest in and to the support payments, thereby leaving her not a proper
party to the herein action and having no
interest therein.
(fZ. 45).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and also in objecting to the conclusion of law:
Defendant objects to the Conclusion of
Law of the Court since the Conclusions are
not based upon the facts as presented to
the Court, that the plaintiff, by her own
testimony, stated that all of her right,
title and interest has been assigned to
the State of Oregon and that she is not
a proper plaintiff, and that the complaint
should be dismissed.
( R. 46).
Nevertheless, the court found:
That the plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the defendant in the amount
of $11,220.65.
(R. 28, Conclusion ,12).
The court handled the assignment issue in the following
manner:
. the State of Oregon may be entitled
to all or a part of this judgment and if
so, the State of Oregon would be entitled
to an appropriate assignment from this
plaintiff in that amount.
Appellant maintains that the lower court acted against
the weight of the evidence in failing to find an assignment
and manifestly misapplied the law in failing to bar Mrs.
Crompton from asserting claims in which she had no interest.
POINT I
THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ENCOMPASSES BOTH FACTUAL
AND LEGAL ISSUES.
In equitable actions appellate review traditionally
encompasses both the law and the facts.

This broad scope

review is l·larranted because the original trial involved no
finder of fact other than a judse, so the appellate court
may easily place itself in the position of the trier of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-4Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

o[

fact, which is not possible in review of jury trials.

Some

jurisdictions have even adopted a trial de novo review of
equity cases in their supreme courts.
Vehrs,

See e.g., Smith v.

242 P.2d 586 (Ore. 1952).

Utah, while not providing for a trial de novo procedure
in equitable proceedings, does provide for appellate review
of the record on both legal and factual issues.

This scope

of review of equity cases is founded in the Utah Constitution.
The appeal shall be upon the record made
in the court below. , . In equity cases
the appeal may be on questions of both
law and fact. .
(Utah Const. art. 8,
§9).

Essentially the same language is found in Rule 72(a) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
In equity cases the appeal may be on
questions of both law and fact.
Thus, where the decision below was bottomed in equity and
where the appellant questions the findings of fact, it is
the duty of the appellate court to review the accuracy of
both the findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Under Article VIII, Section IX, Constitution
of Utah, it is both the duty and prerogative
of this court in an equitable actlon to review the law and the facts and make its own
findings and substitute its judgment for
that of the trial court. Mitchell v.
~litchell, 527 P.2d 1359, 1360 (Utah 1974)).
See also Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Utah 57, 276 P. 912, 69 A.L.R.
Hl6 (1928).
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That this Court has such broad review power is evidenced
by the customary appellate disposition of equity cases where
the evidence is not found lacking.

Generally,

this Court

has not remanded equity cases after appellate review, but
rather has entered or directed judgment.
In view, therefore, that this is purely an
equitable proceeding which comes to this
court upon questions of both law and fact,
we have the power, and it is our duty, to
either make findings and render judgment
in accordance with the facts and the law
applicable thereto, or direct that such
findings and judgment be made and entered
by the court below.
(Johnson v. Seagull
Inv. Co., 65 Utah 424, 237 P. 945 (1925).
See also St. George and Washington Canal Co. v. Hurricane
Canal Co., 93 Utah 262,

72 P.2d 642 (1937).

in a recent Oklahoma case, Matter of Reyna,

As was stated
546 P.2d 622,

( Ok 1 a . 1 9 7 6 ) :
In a case of equitable cognizance, the
Supreme Court may weigh the evidence
and enter such judgment as the trial
court should have rendered.
(546 P.2d
at 625).
Entry of judgment by the appellate court is made
following the review of equity cases because the appellate
court has full power to find the facts, make conclusions of
law, and enter judgnent.

Of course, where the court feels

there is more necessary evidence available, not in the
record,

it may remand for further taking of evidence, either

retaining the case for procee:lings after the further evidc,.Ci
is gathered or remanding it entirely for bulh findin~s an~
conclusions in the lower court.
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Appellant contends that the finding relating to the
assignment does not reflect the testimony at trial.

For

this reason, review of the factual finding as well as the
legal conclusion, as to the effect of the assignment is
sought by the appellant.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE UNEQUIVOCALLY INDICATES AN ASSIGNMENT.
The trial court refused to make an unequivocal finding
as to the assignment in favor of the State of Oregon, saying
only that if such an assignment existed, the State of Oregon
would be entitled to an assignment in its favor.
The unequivocal, uncontradicted evidence was that such
an assignment existed.
this testimony.

In fact,

(T. 8:8-18).

the respondent herself gave

In the absence of any evidence

to contradict the testimony of assignment, it was clearly
improper to enter the equivocal finding.

As stated in

Corbet v. Corbet, 24 Utah 2d 378, 472 P.2d 430 (1970) this
court will reverse factual findings of the trial court when
those findings are clearly preponderated against the evidence
in the record.

Surely, where the trial court has declined

to find an assignment in the face of a clear admission of an
assignment, this court should reverse the lower court's
findiny.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT III
THE COURT MANIFESTLY MISAPPLIED THE LAW TO THE FACTS
THIS CASE.

OF

In light of the clear testimony of an assignment, it
was manifestly improper for the trial court to allow judgment for the plaintiff-respondent in the amount of all the
arrearages, including claims assigned to the State of Orego:.
A.

An Assignor is not entitled to sue on
assigned claims.

The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure require that actions
be "prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest".
U.R.C.f'. 17(a).
law.

This requirement has a long history in Utah

In l'iilson v. Kiesel, 9 Utah 377, 35 P. 488 (1894) this

court noted that Utah statutes required "that every action

must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest," I
I

35 P.2d at 491, citing 2 Comp. Laws of Utah 1888 §3169.
That case held that an assignor had no right to prosecute an
action on an assigned claim.
That the assignee of a claim is the proper party to
bring suit is affirDed in Lynch v. MacDonald, 12 Utah 2d
427, 367 P.2d 464 (1962).

The reason for this rule is that

an assignor has no further interest in the claim, and havin0
received a valuable consideration for making the assignment,
would be unjustly enriched if permitted to recover on a
claim after havin<J J:;si<Jncd it.
especially applicabL' in this

The policy of the rule is

:nt'<~ent

case, l·lh··t·e

i1t·3.
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Oregon in return for her assignment, and now seeks to recover
arrearages for which the State of Oregon has made compensat ion.

The State of Oregon has the right to those claims.

For an example of a case in which courts have barred
assignors from suit, see Acme Blackshop Paving Co. v.
Brown & Matthews,

Inc.,

31 A.D.2d 1042, 294 N.Y.S.2d 826

(1968).
Clearly, an assignor is not entitled to maintain an
action on a claim in which the assignor has no interest.
B.

Respondent assigned her rights to support
pr1or to January, 1976, to the State of
Oregon.

Respondent,

by her own testimony, assigned her rights

to support payments prior to January, 1976,
Oregon,
18)

to the State of

in return for state assistance payments.

(R. 8:8-

The right assigned was founded on the divorce decree

filed July 9, 1969, and as modified February 1, 1974.

Under

the decree, periodic payments were to be made to the respondent Mrs. Crompton.

In such a continuing obligation the

right is not to be a lump sum but to the recurrent installments.
The obligation can best be viewed as several obligations,
with due dates falling monthly, one after another.

While

Mrs. Crompton is entitled to payments not assigned, she is
not entitled to payments assigned, during her receipt of
state payments.
paym~nts

By her own admission she assigned all

prior to January, 1976.

In a similar case, where there was an assignment of
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assignor, this Court has adhered to the rule that the
assignee is the proper party to sue on the assigned claims.
Chesney v. District Court
108 P.2d 514 (1941).
C.

of Salt Lake County, 99 Utah 513,

That rule should apply in this case.

Respondent is not entitled to amounts
accrued pr1or to January, 1976.

Clearly in light of the admission of assignment,

and;~,

light of the law stating that an assignor has no right to
bring an action on an assigned claim,

it is manifestly

apparent that the lower court misapplied the law to these
facts.

Where such is the case, this Court may correct the

judgment below.
28 Utah 2d 368,

See Elton v.

Utah State Retirement Board,

503 P.2d 137 (1972)

for a statement of this

rule.
Appellant urges a correction of the findings to reflect
the admitted assignments in favor of the State of Oreg?n,
and a correction of the judgment to include the net amount
accrued since January, 1976.
CONCLUSION
The evidence at trial could not have been more cogent
in establishing an assignment of support payments in favor
of the State of Oregon.

Ap~ellant

raised his objection to

respondent's assertion of assigned claims at all at'rropriate
times.

The equities certainly do not favor an iHnrJ lo ilrs.
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Reversal or amendment of the judgment to include only
the amounts accrued since January 1976, less payments made,
is respectfully
DATED this

req~d.

07 t~f

day of October,
/~
"'-'-~7/"/~.
,
or:
HOW D, LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84601
Attorneys for Appellant
///

/
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